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This 1818 map by John Melish shows St. Louis in the context of Alton, Carondelet, and Cahokia, suggesting the region as
Clark knew it. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
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Cahokia
Cahokia was founded by the Seminary Priests of the
Foreign Mission of Quebec in January of 1699. It was the
first permanent French settlement in the Mid-Mississippi
Valley, and today it is the oldest town on the Mississippi
River. The Seminary Priests came to preach the gospel
to the Cahokia and Tamaroa Indians, members of the
Illiniwek Confederacy. Over time the priests were joined
by fur traders and farmers. Close to the mouths of the
Missouri and Illinois rivers, Cahokia was an excellent
location for the fur trade, and the fertile valley in which
it lay, eventually known as the American Bottoms, made
Cahokia ideal for farming. Joining the Illiniwek and the
French Canadians were enslaved Africans.2
This mixed community suffered a double blow in
the mid-1760s. First, as a result of the French and Indian
War, France ceded much of her North American empire,
including the Illinois Country, in 1763. Cahokia was
now a possession of England, the ancient enemy of the
Gallic people. England was also a Protestant nation, often
hostile to Catholicism and Catholics. The priests sold their
property in Cahokia and crossed the Mississippi River to
what had become Spanish Upper Louisiana. They were
soon followed by many other residents of Cahokia, all
seeking refuge in the territory of Catholic Spain.3
The second blow came when Pierre Leclede and
Auguste Chouteau founded a fur trading post almost
directly across the Mississippi River from Cahokia in
February of 1764. St. Louis almost immediately ended
Cahokia’s role in the fur trade. No longer an active
Catholic mission or a center of the fur trade, Cahokia
became primarily an agricultural community. This was the
town that Capt. Joseph Bowman and his 30 mounted “Big
Knives” entered on July 6, 1778.

George Rogers Clark
& The Western Campaign
Bowman and his men were part of the small army
raised by George Rogers Clark in 1778 to fight the
British and their Indian allies primarily in the Mississippi,
Wabash, and Ohio River Valleys. Their mission was to
seize control of strategic locations and thereby thwart raids
into Kentucky. Clark firmly believed that the very survival
of the Kentucky settlements depended on offensive rather
than defensive action. The war had to be taken to the
enemy. But the authority and resources to raise such a
force and conduct such a campaign required the consent
and assistance of Virginia, of which Kentucky was then a
county.4
Clark left Kentucky in October of 1777 to appeal to
Virginia’s government to authorize and support his plan.
Clark was persuasive in large measure due to his extensive
cache of intelligence and his ability to connect Kentucky’s
interests with those of the rest of Virginia. Clark had
sent spies to the Illinois Country to ascertain British
strength, French sentiment, Indian intentions, and Spanish
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George Rogers Clark (1752–1818) was the second-oldest
brother of explorer and Missouri territorial governor William
Clark. As a Brigadier General in the Virginia militia, he
was the highest-ranking American officer in the Ohio Valley
during the War of Independence. Debts he incurred during
the war to supply his troops left his personal finances in ruins
for the rest of his life. George Catlin painted this miniature
portrait on ivory from an earlier portrait. (Image: Missouri
History Museum)

sympathies. What they learned and what Clark reported
to the Virginia government was encouraging. British
strength was based at Detroit, far to the north of Clark’s
immediate objectives in the Mississippi and Wabash River
Valleys. Further, they “had but little expectation of a visit
from us. . . .”5 The Illinois French in those areas were at
best lukewarm to the British and would likely support the
Patriot cause. The Indians were indeed intent on attacking
Kentucky. Lastly, the Spanish in St. Louis appeared
sympathetic to the Americans despite Spain’s official
neutrality.6
In addition to presenting actionable intelligence, Clark
also described how Virginia’s more easterly settlements
would be exposed to Indian attacks if the Kentucky
settlements were destroyed or abandoned. Britishsponsored Indian attacks on Kentucky had increased
sharply during 1777, and the Virginia county simply did
not have the resources to provide for its own defense. If
assistance from Williamsburg was not forthcoming, then
these western settlements would either be destroyed or
abandoned, leaving more easterly settlements open to
attack. It was therefore in Virginia’s interests to support her
most western county in its hour of need.
Clark presented his plan to Governor Patrick Henry

on December 10, 1777. Henry approved the plan, as did
Virginia’s Council, on January 2, 1778, while the General
Assembly authorized the creation of a force “to march
against and attack any of our western enemies.” Clark was
commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia regular
army (as opposed to militia) and given wide-ranging
discretion to conduct the campaign as he saw fit.7
Clark’s first objective was to actually raise an army.
Recruiting was somewhat less than successful, and Clark
eventually had to settle for a force of only 175 men
instead of the 350 to 500 he had originally envisioned.
Clark compensated for this by instilling a bit of military
discipline and rigorously training what troops he did
have. The small army, referred to as the “Big Knives”
by the First Nations and the Illinois French, left Corn
Island, future site of Louisville, on June 24, 1778. Its first
objective was the de facto capitol of the British Illinois
Country: Kaskaskia.
Clark captured Kaskaskia on the evening of July 4,
1778. Lacking a sizable army, Clark used speed, surprise,
and psychology to subdue the Illinois French residents
of the village. Clark’s use of psychology to first instill
fear of his men and then support for the Patriot cause was
masterful. The residents of Kaskaskia quickly and eagerly
joined Clark, Virginia, and the United States, taking a
loyalty oath on July 5. With Kaskaskia secure, Clark
ordered Capt. Bowman and a company of 30 mounted
men to ride north and take control of Prairie du Rocher, St.
Philippe, and Cahokia.8
Bowman and his men, joined by local Illinois French,
rode out of Kaskaskia on July 5. Both Prairie du Rocher
and St. Philippe fell quickly. Like Clark, Bowman used
speed and surprise to good effect. But he also had several
residents of Kaskaskia to vouch for his good intentions and
the Patriot cause. The residents of both Prairie du Rocher
and St. Philippe surrendered quickly and as Bowman
wrote, “were willing to comply with any terms I should
propose.”9
So it was that the Americans rode into Cahokia
on July 6. According to Bowman, “We rode up to
the commander’s house and demanded a surrender.
He accordingly surrendered himself, likewise all the
inhabitants of the place.” But whereas the residents
of Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, and St. Philippe had
surrendered immediately and unconditionally, the people
of Cahokia were a bit more difficult for the Big Knives to
bend to their will. Bowman continues: “I then demanded
of them to take the oath of fidelity to the states, otherwise
I should treat them as enemies. They told me they would
give me an answer next morning.” Adding to Bowman’s
worries that first night, “there was a man in the town
who would call in one hundred and fifty Indians to his
assistance and cut me off. This fellow I took care to
secure; but we lay upon our arms the whole of the night. .
. .” Fortunately, Bowman and his men “took possession of
a strong stone house, well fortified for war,” and thus had a
secure place to lay upon their arms.10
The next morning, the villagers agreed to take the
oath of allegiance to Virginia and the United States, having

made their point by waiting some 12 hours to do so. Even
so, according to Clark, “some Individuals said that the
Town was given up too tamely. . . .”11 This was the first,
but by no means the last, time that the people of Cahokia
demonstrated an independent streak.
As commanding officer in Cahokia, Bowman was
responsible for both military and civilian affairs. His first
priority was to provide for the defense of the village. The
old ramshackle French fort that once stood where Village
Hall is today had been quickly replaced by the British
in 1765 by the stone rectory which stood in what is now
called the Cahokia Wedge. Like his British predecessors,
Bowman decided to use this “strong stone house” as a fort.
Repairs were made, and the building was christened Fort
Bowman, the Revolution’s westernmost American fort.
In addition, the local militia was mustered into American
service.12 Having settled military matters, Bowman turned
to civil affairs. He organized a local court, and he was
elected its first president. This court met in the home of
Francois Saucier; the building was later purchased by St.
Clair County to serve as the first county courthouse in
the first county of what became the State of Illinois. The
building still stands, and it is open to the public as the
Cahokia Courthouse State Historic Site.13
Most of the Illinois French had indeed swung to the
Patriot cause. Now Clark had to come to terms with the
various First Nations of the Mid-Mississippi Valley and
surrounding areas. Many of these tribes began to gather
at Cahokia to treat with Clark and his Big Knives. A
conference between Clark and the Indians at Cahokia was
organized in August. The location of these discussions
was more than likely near Fort Bowman. Indeed, we know
that many Indians were camped at the eastern end of the
Cahokia Wedge before and during their meetings with
Clark.14
Regardless of the exact location, the “amazing
number” of assembled Indians significantly outnumbered
Clark and his small force.15 Clark once again used
psychology to compensate for a lack of troops. The
American commander stressed that he was seeking neither
peace nor war, but instead desired to know which of the
two the Indians intended. He emphasized that he respected
them as men and as warriors, and as such expected them to
speak truthfully and live by whichever decision they made.
But he also emphasized that the British had misled the
Indians regarding both the Americans’ and London’s true
intentions. Clark maintained that Americans only wanted
the freedom to govern themselves, while the British were
using the various tribes to fight their war for them. Clark’s
credibility was supported by the Spanish. “The friendly
correspondence between the Spaniards and ourselves was
also much to our advantage, since everything the Indians
heard from them was favorable to us,” Clark wrote in his
memoir.16
This combination of bluff, bravado, respect, appeal to
self interest, and Spanish support worked. Despite a failed
attempt by some Indians to kidnap him, Clark’s conference
was a great success. During the five weeks he spent at
Cahokia, the American commander negotiated peace with
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The Revolutionary War in the trans-Appalachian West was marked by skirmishes between smaller forces and Native
Americans whom the British convinced to side with them against the Americans, as this map suggests. (Image: Albert
Bushnell, The American Nation, vol. 14, 1906)

at least ten of the First Nations that were represented there.
These peace agreements neutralized a large number of
potential British recruits.17 The local Illinois French largely
supported the Patriot cause, and now many Indians swore
peace and neutrality. Clark’s success with these two groups
was mirrored by his success with a third important player
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley: Spain.

Spanish-American Contacts & Relations
Clark’s intelligence from St. Louis proved accurate.
Local Spanish officials were indeed sympathetic to Clark
and his army. “Our friends, the Spanyards, [did] everything
in their power to convince me of their friendship,” Clark
wrote to a friend.18 This was especially true of the Spanish
Lt. Gov. Fernando de Leyba. Immediately following
Bowman’s successful occupation of Cahokia, de Leyba
sent him a message of congratulations and welcome. He
also wrote a similar letter to Clark in Kaskaskia. Clark
responded to de Leyba with a July 13 letter in which he
expressed his thanks and hope for continued friendship
between Americans and Spaniards: “Dear Sir, I received
your letter of the 8th Instant and with pleasure read the
contints wherein you expressed the deepest sentiments
of your real Friendship to me and the American Cause
a Friendship that is valuable to us. We have already
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Clark was known as the “Hannibal of the West” by the end
of the Revolutionary War, and he remained a heroic figure,
as is seen by his commemoration on this stamp marking the
150th anniversary of his victory at Vincennes. (Image: U.S.
Bureau of Engraving and Printing)

In this 1804 scene of St. Louis as it appeared from Illinois, Fort San Carlos can be seen in the center. (Image: Missouri
History Museum)

experienced it and hope to Merit a Continuation thereof.”
He was especially grateful for de Leyba’s “treatment to
Captain Bowman and Speaches to the Savages in favour of
us.”19
These letters were the beginning of an important
working relationship between the Americans and Spanish
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley. This relationship was
described in an April 23, 1779, letter from de Leyba to
Patrick Henry: “From the time that my friend Colonel
Clark arrived in this place, fraternal harmony has reigned
between the people from the United States and the
vassals of his Catholic Majesty.”20 And as Clark wrote
in his memoir, “Friendly correspondence which at once
commenced between the Spanish officers and ourselves
added much to the general tranquility and happiness.”21
This friendship was especially true of Clark and de Leyba
themselves. Clark was a frequent guest of de Leyba in
St. Louis, and a close working relationship between
the two was forged by these visits and a continuous
correspondence.
Spanish friendship though was also very much
based on Spanish interests. Even before Clark and his
army arrived in the Illinois Country, the Spanish were
considering their options vis-à-vis the British Empire.
The British had held Gibraltar since 1713, and they had
taken Majorca in the Mediterranean and Florida in North
America as a result of the late French and Indian War.
Spanish calculations in the Mississippi Valley were but
one part of a much larger Spanish strategy. The goal of
that strategy was to return those lost lands to Spain and
to expand Spain’s position in the Mississippi Valley.22
During the late 1770s and early 1780s, this goal meshed
reasonably well with the American goal of independence.
Bernardo de Galvez, Spanish Governor of Louisiana,
instructed de Leyba to assist Clark as much as possible,
but in secret. He also allowed Oliver Pollock, purchasing
agent for both the Continental Congress and Virginia
in New Orleans, to conduct his operations in Spanish
territory freely. Of course, neither act was in keeping with

Spain’s official position of neutrality.23
Clark’s ultimate goal was to take Detroit. It was the
most important British post in the West, and it served as a
garrison town, supply depot, and meeting place for British
officers and their Indian allies. Clark believed that if he
could take Detroit, he could largely neutralize British
efforts in the western theater of the war. However, Clark’s
plans for a strike at Detroit were subordinated to the need
to expel the British from Fort Sackville, which the British
had retaken in December of 1778. Clark’s expedition to
Vincennes included many Cahokia residents who were
eager to remove the British from Fort Sackville, and thus
remove a major threat to their community.
Once Vincennes was back in American hands, Clark
again planned an expedition against Detroit. As he did
before his move into the Illinois Country, Clark sought
to gather intelligence on the lands he intended to enter.
To that end, he ordered Capt. Godefroy Linctot to take
his company of Cahokia volunteers north and scout the
Illinois River Valley and beyond. In a June 1779 letter to
Linctot, Clark ordered him “to take Charge of a Volunteer
Company raised at Cahos and march by way of the Illinois
River to the British post Called Ome (on the Miami
River) which I make no doubt but that you can easily get
possession of by which Means you probably may be safe
while you have an opportunity of treating with the Indians
in that Quarter. . . .”24 Unfortunately for Clark, the British
were planning offensive operations of their own.

Battle of Ft. San Carlos
Spain’s entry into the war in 1779 added another
factor to British strategic planning in the transAppalachian West. While still a major European power,
Spain’s resources in this particular theater of the war
were quite limited. Very few troops from the Louisiana
Regiment were stationed in Upper Louisiana, leaving
defense primarily to local militia, and the Spanish fort at
the mouth of the Missouri River was literally falling down.
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Further, the Spanish had been assisting Clark and his men
since their arrival in 1778, but the official peace between
Great Britain and Spain had limited the British response.
Now, with war officially declared, the British could reduce
if not eliminate Spanish assistance to the rebels, as well as
force open the rich fur trade of the Missouri River Valley,
long closed to British traders by Spanish regulations.25
The attack on St. Louis and Cahokia was thus part of a
multipronged offensive planned to sweep through the
Mississippi Valley. The timing could not have been better
for the British or worse for the Allies. The British had
spent considerable time courting various First Nations,
and as a result they could recruit hundreds of warriors to
their colors. Conversely, Spanish and American forces
in the Mississippi Valley were weak and spread thinly
among various forts and settlements. Further, Clark was
preoccupied with building Fort Jefferson. Located on the
Mississippi River south of the Ohio, Clark planned to
concentrate what troops he did have at the new post once
it was complete. Both Spanish forces in St. Louis and
American forces in Cahokia would have to rely on local
Illinois French militia to flesh out their thin ranks.26
Further, the “Hard Winter” of 1779–1780 was the
most severe in years. Ice and snow covered much of the
country from the Great Lakes to Virginia. Game became
scarce, livestock died, and food stores dwindled. Both
civilians and soldiers suffered during these bitterly cold
months. The only benefit of this severe weather was that
it curtailed the military activities of the British and their
Indian allies.27
But while the British were relatively quiet in the West,
they were shifting their primary focus of the war in the
East to the southern states, including Virginia. This meant
that the Old Dominion had even fewer resources to send
west as it faced British troops in the east. In New Orleans,
Oliver Pollock had gone bankrupt trying to supply Clark,
and he could no longer support the small American force
in the Mississippi Valley. Clark’s army was cold and short
of supplies, and desertion was becoming a problem.28
Unhappily for the British, these advantages were
negated by one major disadvantage: the loss of the element
of surprise. Word of the impending attack reached St.
Louis and Cahokia long before the British attack force
arrived. This gave the Allies time to prepare their defenses.
Col. John Montgomery, American military commander
in the Illinois Country, responded to the situation
as best he could. In a May 15, 1780, letter to Clark,
Montgomery stated that “the Bad nues . . . Compelled
Me to March with out loss of Time to the asistance of the
inhabetents of Kaho. . . .” Luckily for Montgomery, his
small force included many “inhabetents of Kaho [w]ho
have Digtinguished them Selves More like Vetrons than
ondesiplened men and are Redy to turn out to a man to Go
Any Where the[y] are Requested.”29 Despite the skill and
reliability of his Cahokia militia, if Montgomery stood
a chance of successfully defending the village he would
have to be reinforced before the hammer fell. Some help
did come in early May when Capt. John Rogers arrived
with a company of mounted Virginians. Rogers and his
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Col. John Montgomery (c. 1750–1794) served with George
Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country in the War of American
Independence. Montgomery came by his revolutionary
credentials honestly; he was one of the 13 signers of the
Fincastle Resolutions, in which the elected representatives of
Fincastle County, Virginia Colony, told Virginia’s delegation
to the First Continental Congress of their support of breaking
with the British Crown in January 1775. (Image: Nashville
CivicScope)

men made repairs to Fort Bowman and “Put it in Some
Poster of Defence.”30
As the situation worsened, Cahokia appealed to
Clark, now a full colonel, for assistance. The Board of
Magistrates sent Charles Gratiot, a Swiss-born Cahokia
resident and prominent merchant, to present Clark with a
letter dated April 11 in which the magistrates explained the
village’s desperate situation: “We are on the eve of being
attacked in our village by considerable parties of savages
and will not be able to work at the cultivation of our
fields, if we do not have prompt succor. . . .” Their letter
also reflected the “Hard Winter” as they went on to write,
“but what afflicts us the most is this, that in case you send
us many men, we should not have the provisions which
would be necessary for them. . . .”31 One the signatories of
this letter was Pierre Martin, whose house still stands in
Prairie du Pont just south of Cahokia. In a May 11, 1780,
letter to Oliver Pollock, Clark reflected on the gravity of
the situation: “The Illenois Settlement are much threatened
by the British Gentlemen at Detroit. . . .”32
On May 15, Montgomery and Rogers crossed the

Mississippi from Cahokia to St. Louis to confer with de
Leyba on how to respond to the threat with a combined
and coherent strategy. Perhaps reflecting Clark’s tactical
thinking, Montgomery suggested that the Allies strike first.
De Leyba agreed, promising Spanish support for such a
campaign. However, the American delay in obtaining boats
and provisions for the expedition resulted in the attack on
St. Louis and Cahokia occurring before Montgomery was
able to move.33
The British force that attacked Cahokia and St. Louis
on May 26, 1780, was composed primarily of warriors
from various First Nations and commanded by Emmanuel
Hesse. In a February 17, 1780, letter to his superiors,
Michilimackinac Lt. Gov. Patrick Sinclair described
Hesse as “a Trader and a man of character (formerly in the
60th Regt). . . .”34 Thus Hesse was familiar with Britain’s
Indian allies and frontier warfare, and he was deemed
reliable. The Indians he commanded largely came from
the Sauk and Fox, Menominee, Winnebago, and Ojibwe
nations. Hesse and his force left Michilimackinac on
March 10 and moved south to Prairie du Chien. There
Hesse recruited more men. On May 2, Hesse and his force
of approximately 1,000 left Prairie du Chien and headed
south toward St. Louis and Cahokia.35
Both Montgomery and de Leyba sent dispatches to
Clark requesting that he leave Fort Jefferson and march
north to aid in the defense of Cahokia and St. Louis. Clark
arrived in Cahokia on May 25, and he immediately crossed
the Mississippi River to confer with de Leyba in St. Louis.
Afterwards, he returned to Cahokia to supervise its defense
against approximately 300 warriors led by Jean Marie
Ducharme.36
There is precious little in the primary sources which
describes the fighting at Cahokia. One such document
is a letter from Montgomery to the Honorable Board of
Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accounts
dated February 22, 1783. In it, Montgomery gives a brief
description of events:
In the Spring of 1780, we were threatened with
an Invasion. Genl: Clark [promoted in 1781]
being informed of it Hurreyed his departure with
a small body of troops to the Falls of the mouth
of the Ohio, when he received other expresses
from the Spanish Comm’dts and myself, luckily
joined me at Cohos, time enough to save the
country from Impending ruin, as the Enimy
appeared in great force within twenty-four hours
after his arrival. Finding that they were likely to
be disappointed in their Design, they retired after
doing some mischief on the Span’h shore, . . .37
In a September 1780 letter, the Cahokians themselves
described how the Indians’ “slack manner of making war”
resulted in little “carnage in our country.”38
While Clark’s force and the residents of Cahokia did
not suffer the losses that St. Louis did, there were losses
nonetheless. According to a July 8, 1780, letter by Sinclair,
“The Rebels lost an officer and three men killed at the

Cahokias & five Prisoners.”39 With the fighting at Cahokia
and St. Louis over, the Indian force retreated north. The
Mississippi Valley component of the British offensive
collapsed. Soon, the entire offensive ground to a halt. Once
it had, Clark again turned his attention to Detroit. Included
in his calculations was the possible inclusion of Spanish
troops in such a campaign.

Spanish-American
Combined Operations
After successfully defending Cahokia, Clark returned
to Fort Jefferson. Before leaving, he issued orders to
Montgomery to counterattack the Indians who had just
attacked Cahokia. Specifically, Montgomery was to pursue
the retreating Indians, degrade that force when and where
possible, and destroy the primary Sauk and Fox towns.
Montgomery’s force of approximately 350 men contained
Cahokia militia as well as 100 Spanish troops, making this
an Allied offensive. The resulting Rock River Expedition
illustrated that Spanish and American commanders
could cooperate on offensive as well as on defensive
operations.40
Describing the expedition in a September 21, 1780,
letter to Augustin Mottin de la Balme, a former French
officer who claimed to act on behalf of the King of France,
the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” recounted the beginning of
the campaign: “Oh, Colonel Clark, affecting always to
desire our public welfare and under pretext of avenging
us, soon formed with us conjointly with the Spaniards a
party of more than three hundred men to go and attack in
their own village the savages who had come to our homes
to harass us, and after substituting Colonel Montgomery to
command in his place, he soon left us.”41
Montgomery wrote that after receiving his instructions
from Clark, he “immediately proceeded to the Business I
was order’d and march’d three hundred and fifty men to
the Lake open on the Illinois River, and from thence to the
Rock River, Destroying the Towns and crops proposed, the
Enimy not daring to fight. . . .”42
While Montgomery seemed satisfied with the
campaign’s outcome, the Cahokians’ experience in the
Rock River Expedition must have left something to be
desired. In the same letter to Mottin de la Balme quoted
above, the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” described in detail the
shortcomings of the Anglo-American forces: “It is then,
well to explain to you, sir, that the Virginians, who never
employed any principle of economy, have been the cause
by their lack of management and bad conduct, of the nonsuccess of the expedition and that our glorious projects
have failed through their fault: for the savages abandoned
their nearest villages, where we have been, and we were
forced to stop and not push on further, since we had almost
no more provisions, powder, balls, which the Virginians
had undertaken to furnish us.”43 This letter again illustrates
the independence of thought and opinion that characterized
the residents of Cahokia.
But the unsatisfactory experience with the Rock River
campaign, organized and commanded by Americans, did
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not deter Cahokians from cooperating with their neighbors
to the west. Spanish troops and Cahokia militia cooperated
in patrolling the areas north of Cahokia and St. Louis. In
August 1780, these patrols repulsed an Indian probe into
their area of operations.44
Cahokians also joined an expedition led by Mottin de
la Balme. The goal of his expedition north was to attack
Detroit. If Clark and his Virginians could not achieve
this, then perhaps this representative of the former mother
country could. Mottin de la Balme and his mixed force of
Illinois French and Indians got as far as the headwaters of
the Maumee River where the Frenchman and most of his
troops were killed by Miami warriors. Before his death,
Mottin de la Balme had detached a small force of Cahokia
French to attack the British post at St. Joseph, modern-day
Niles, Michigan. Their attack was successful, and the post
was destroyed. But the Cahokians themselves were then
attacked by a party of British traders and Potawatomi.
Only three of them returned home.45 This defeat moved
the residents of Cahokia to strike at St. Joseph once again.
However, the new expedition would include their allies
from across the river.
In St. Louis, Lt. Gov. Francisco Cruzat, who had
replaced the deceased de Leyba in September 1780,
authorized a Spanish expedition against St. Joseph.
He appointed Capt. Eugenio Pierra (Eugene Pourré) to
organize and command this campaign. Pierra raised a
mixed force of 65 Spanish militia, 60 Indians, and 20
Cahokia French. Pierra and his men left St. Louis on
January 2, 1781, and arrived at St. Joseph on the 12th. Only
a few British traders and Indians were present, and the
Spanish-led force had no difficulty taking the post. Pierra
and his men wasted little time in destroying St. Joseph
and returning to St. Louis.46 Ominously for the future of
Spanish-American relations, Pierra raised the Spanish flag
over the post and claimed the region for Spain.

Conclusion
Pierra’s action at St. Joseph foreshadowed over a
century of Spanish-American rivalry that stretched from
the Mississippi Valley to South America.47 However,
Spanish-American cooperation during the Revolutionary
War, especially at the Battle of Fort San Carlos, secured
the Northwest Territory and a Mississippi River boundary
for the new nation when peace finally came in 1783.
Clark’s successful campaign in the trans-Appalachian
West was in large part made possible by Spanish assistance
and cooperation. Like the French in the East, the Spanish
in the West were of critical importance in securing
American victory. Spanish supplies, Spanish troops, and
Spanish diplomatic support with the Indians not only
enabled Clark and his small army to successfully occupy
and defend the old French villages of Cahokia, Vincennes,
and Kaskaskia, but also to use them as staging areas to
strike at the British and their First Nation allies further
north.
Of particular importance to Clark was the financing
of his army and its operations. This was largely done by
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Oliver Pollock in New Orleans. Pollock used his personal
wealth as collateral for purchases of Spanish goods made
by Virginia and the United States. But it was Pollock’s
personal connections to Spanish officials, including
governors, which made these purchases possible. In an
April 22, 1788, letter to Pollock, William Heth stated:
“There is no circumstance of which I am more convinced
than that the conquest of the Illinois country could not
have been maintained by Virginia and that consequently
that it would not now form part of the United States
if it had not been for your assistance and very liberal
advances.”48 Heth was one of three commissioners
appointed to sort out the debts owed to New Orleans
merchants contracted by Pollock on behalf of Virginia
and Congress. Pollock’s personal wealth and connections
served Clark and the Patriot cause in the West extremely
well.
The role of Cahokia and its people in the western
theater of the Revolutionary War was also important.
Cahokia was the site of Clark’s Indian conference that
bought precious months of peace which enabled the
Americans to secure their position in the Illinois County.
The village’s location near St. Louis enabled American
commanders to maintain regular contact with their Spanish
allies. Officers stationed at Fort Bowman in Cahokia
were often in St. Louis conferring with their Spanish
counterparts. Cahokia’s location also made it an ideal spot
from which to launch operations to the north, and to act
as a shield for the villages further south. The people of
Cahokia themselves gave valuable service to the Patriot
cause and the Allied war effort by fighting in several
engagements and under a variety of commanders: the
American Clark, the Frenchman Mottin de la Balme, and
the Spaniard Pierra.
It was also at Cahokia, and St. Louis, that the
Americans, Spanish, and the Illinois French broke the
grand British offensive of 1780. The Battle of Fort San
Carlos left British operations in the West in shambles. The
war wound down and ended before another attempt could
be made to drive the Americans and the Spanish from the
Mississippi Valley. This in turn left Virginia and the United
States in possession of the lands between the Appalachian
Mountains and the Mississippi River. Though their actual
control of these lands was tenuous, Clark’s western
campaign and his defense of Cahokia on May 26, 1780,
gave the United States the ability to successfully press
its claims to this territory during peace negotiations with
the British. Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison testified
to this in a July 2, 1783, letter to Clark: “[M]y thanks
and those of my Council for the very great and singular
services you have rendered your Country, in wresting so
great and valuable a territory out of the hands of the British
Enemy, repelling the attacks of their savage allies, and
carrying on successful war in the heart of their country.”49
Thus, in conjunction with his Spanish allies and with the
aid of the village and people of Cahokia, George Rogers
Clark and his army of “Big Knives” secured an America
not bound to the Atlantic seaboard.
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